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APPROACHES TO REGULATORY REFORM IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A RESPONSE TO THE 
REMARKS OF PROFESSORS LEVIN AND 
FREEMAN 
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS*
It is a great pleasure to meet with the Japanese American Society for 
Legal Studies at a time when both the Japanese administrative law system1 
and legal education system2 are undergoing such a sea-change. As one 
who has had a chance to participate in the latter change, I would say I that 
think the new system of “American-style” law schools in Japan will surely 
help to bring our two academic communities into a very collaborative 
relationship in the years to come. 
I only have a short time to supplement the excellent presentations by 
my colleagues, so let me take them in turn. 
I. I AGREE WITH PROFESSOR LEVIN! 
First, let me simply add a few words to Professor Levin’s presentation, 
with which I fundamentally agree. It should not be too surprising that he 
and I tend to broadly agree on our views of administrative law. We 
graduated from the same law school one year apart,3 and we both had the 
good fortune to have taken administrative law from the most famous 
scholar in the field at the time, Kenneth Culp Davis, who helped draft our 
APA and later developed the leading treatise on the subject.4 Professor 
Davis once famously wrote that the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
 * Fellow in Law and Government, Washington College of Law, American University; Visiting 
Professor, Ritsumeikan University School of Law, Kyoto, Japan (summer of 2004 & 2005). This talk 
was presented at the meeting of the Japanese American Society for Legal Studies, Tokyo (September 
12, 2004). I especially appreciated the efforts of Professors Takehisa Nakagawa of Kobe University 
and Setsuo Hiyama of Osaka University of Economics and Law for their “collaborative governance” 
of this program. 
 1. See Katsuya Uga, Development of Concepts of “Transparency” and “Accountability” in 
Japanese Administrative Law, 1 U. TOKYO J.L. & POL’Y 25 (2004) (describing the recent acceleration 
of administrative law reform in Japan). 
 2. For a short discussion of this development, see Annie Murphy Paul, Land of the Rising 
Lawyer: A bold solution to Japan's floundering economy: 68 American-style law schools, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2005) at 64. 
 3. University of Chicago Law School. I graduated one year before Professor Levin. 
 4. See Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp Davis, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 315 (2005). 
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procedures (that he had helped to devise) were “one of the greatest 
inventions of modern government.”5
Perhaps that is one reason why Professor Levin and I also tend to agree 
that our APA is, in general, a remarkably good law that has stood the test 
of time quite well. Of course we both think it has some flaws and that it 
could use some updating, but we both oppose the kind of major and 
sometimes radical changes that have been proposed by the business 
community and their supporters in Congress.6 This is especially true with 
regard to rulemaking, but that does not mean that no reforms need to be 
considered. Rather, I believe that the APA forms a good template from 
which to proceed with reforms at the margins.  
A. The ACUS Approach of Incremental Administrative Reform  
Indeed, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), 
for which I served as Research Director from 1982–1995,7 took this 
approach when it issued a “summing up” recommendation in 1993 that set 
out a “coordinated framework of proposals aimed at promoting efficient 
and effective rulemaking.”8 The recommendation addresses the increasing 
complexity of rulemaking caused by the impacts of presidential oversight 
and congressionally mandated additional procedures and analysis 
requirements, and by changes in the timing and intensity of judicial 
review. It also suggests some relatively minor amendments to the APA as 
well as some agency management initiatives.  
In its early years, ACUS proposed the elimination of certain 
exemptions from the APA’s rulemaking requirements for rules involving 
 5. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 at 283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970). 
See also Paul Verkuil, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
511, 520 (1986) (interviewing Kenneth Culp Davis and Walter Gellhorn). 
 6. See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996: Should We 
Be Jubilant at This Jubilee?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 55, 57–60 (1996) (discussing the influence of 
business groups in the regulatory reform debates of the 1980s and 1990s). 
 7. ACUS existed as an agency of the U.S. Government from 1968 until October 1995, when the 
Appropriations Committees of the 104th Congress terminated funding for its operations. See 
Symposium, Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1998). In October 
2004, shortly after this presentation, Congress enacted legislation reauthorizing ACUS, Pub. L. No. 
108–401, 118 Stat. 2255 (2004), but as of February 2006, no appropriations have been made. See 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Consensus-Building in Administrative Law: The Revival of the Administrative 
Conference of the U.S., 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3 (Winter 2005). 
 8. Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 93–4), 58 Fed. 
Reg. 4670 (Feb. 1, 1994). ACUS made over 200 recommendations from 1968 to 1995, many of which 
were implemented. These recommendations are available on the internet today at: http://www.law. 
fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/7
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grants, benefits, loans and contracts.9 The recommendation, emphasizing 
that the rules covered by the exemption “bear heavily upon 
nongovernmental interests,”10 stated that the exemption was “unwise” and 
its elimination will “make for fair, informed exercise of rulemaking 
authority.”11 Although Congress never eliminated the exemptions from the 
APA, the recommendation proved to be quite influential because many 
major rulemaking agencies agreed to follow it and voluntarily adopted 
policies declining to invoke the APA exemption.12 In addition, Congress, 
in many subsequent statutes, expressly required the use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking for particular government grant, benefit, loan, and 
contract programs. For example, the Social Security Act provides that 
regulations prescribing standards for benefits eligibility are subject to 
Section 553 rulemaking procedures.13 Congress also required federal 
procurement regulations to be issued after notice and comment.14  
In 1988, ACUS adopted a recommendation entitled “Presidential 
Review of Agency Rulemaking.”15 This recommendation approved of the 
then controversial practice of presidential review of agency regulations 
begun in the Nixon Administration, but also suggested guidelines for the 
enhanced transparency and timeliness of that review, recommended the 
periodic reconsideration of existing rules, and proposed inclusion of 
independent agencies within the presidential review mechanism. The 
Clinton Administration, in its 1993 Executive Order No. 12,866,16 
 9. Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements 
(Recommendation No. 69–8), 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,784 (July 23, 1973). 
 10. Id. at 19,785. Federal grant, loan, and procurement programs affect the lives of millions of 
persons and the character of the federal system as a whole. The extent of this impact today is of a far 
greater magnitude then it was when the APA, with its exemptions, was enacted in 1946. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Department of Transportation Regulatory Policies and Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 
11,034 (Feb. 26, 1979); see also Department of Housing and Urban Development, Rulemaking: Policy 
and Procedures, 24 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2005); Department of Labor, Rulemaking, 29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (2005); 
Department of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 296.3 (2005); Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 36 
Fed. Reg. 2532 (Feb. 5, 1971); Department of Agriculture, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804 (July 24, 1971); 
Department of the Interior, 36 Fed. Reg. 8,336 (May 4, 1971); Small Business Administration, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 16,716 (Aug. 5, 1971). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 421(k)(2). 
 14. See, e.g., Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98–577, § 302(a), 98 Stat. 3066, 3076 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 418b (2000)) (requiring any 
“procurement policy, regulation, procedure, or form (including amendments or modifications thereto) 
relating to the expenditure of appropriated funds that has (1) a significant effect beyond the internal 
operating procedures of the agency issuing the procurement policy, regulation, procedure or form, or 
(2) a significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors” to be issued only after a 
public comment period of (normally) sixty days).  
 15. Recommendation 88–9, 54 Fed. Reg. 5207 (Feb. 2, 1989).  
 16. Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Ord. No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
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responded by adopting the openness proposals and periodic review 
procedures suggested by ACUS, adding time limits, and partially bringing 
the independent agencies within the presidential review mechanism. The 
Bush II Administration has continued to adhere to E.O. 12,866.17
In its last decade, ACUS was at the forefront of evaluating regulatory 
reform initiatives and in encouraging agency use of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR). The Administrative Conference’s work in promoting 
ADR in the government included applied research, educating agency 
personnel, offering legislative drafting and technical aid to Congress, and 
providing individual agencies with policy advice, systems design, and 
other implementation help. It produced more than a dozen separate 
recommendations. Beginning with its first major ADR recommendation, 
issued in 1986,18 ACUS developed theoretical underpinnings—helping 
agencies begin to think in terms of adapting unfamiliar ADR concepts to 
their various activities, or even creating new ones, such as negotiated 
rulemaking. ACUS then took a lead role in drafting, and getting 
introduced, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act, then working (with others, especially the ABA) to obtain 
passage of these laws in 1990.19 The laws encouraged ADR use, mandated 
appointment of dispute resolution specialists in each agency, and named 
the ACUS as the lead agency for implementation. After enactment of the 
Acts, ACUS worked to build agencies’ capacity to implement them. It 
organized and maintained a roster of neutrals, helped newly appointed 
agency dispute resolution specialists develop policies and start new ADR 
programs, and brought them together in interagency working groups—
staffed by the Administrative Conference, to present materials, seminars, 
and training that no single agency would have done on its own.  
Despite a great deal of support from the bar, members of Congress 
from both parties, the academic community, and unusual letters of support 
from Justices Breyer and Scalia,20 ACUS ran afoul of budget cutters in the 
appropriations subcommittees in the 104th Congress, and rather suddenly, 
 17. President Bush did amend the order to remove the Vice President from the process. Exec. 
Order 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9384 (Feb. 28, 2002). 
 18. See Agencies’ Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution (Recommendation No. 86-3), 
51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (July 16, 1986). 
 19. See infra notes 29–30. 
 20. These two letters are published in Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “If It Didn’t Exist, It Would Have to be 
Invented”—Reviving the Administrative Conference, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 147, 162–67 (1998). The 
two Justices later testified in support of the re-establishment of ACUS. Oversight Hearing on the 
Reauthorization of the Administrative Conference of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10-17 (2004) 
(testimony of Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/7
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after an appropriations conference committee failed to follow the Senate’s 
earlier floor vote to restore its budget, had to close down with one month’s 
notice in October 1995. Its functions went unassigned by the Congress—
not surprisingly leaving a fragmented approach to administrative law 
reform and resource sharing. Only a few aspects of ACUS’s functions 
have since been picked up by other agencies. 
B. Reinventing Government  
The same year that ACUS issued its major rulemaking 
recommendation, 1993, I was asked to lead a team for President Clinton’s 
“Reinventing Government” initiative and helped to produce a report 
entitled “Improving Regulatory Systems.”21 Perhaps the most important 
feature of this report (and its approval by the White House) was that it did 
not really recommend “reinvention” of the regulatory system but instead a 
series of incremental improvements. 
The report recommended better coordination among the agencies and 
the President on regulatory policy.22 It urged the increased use of market-
oriented and other innovative approaches to regulation whenever they are 
appropriate.23 It suggested ways of enhancing public awareness and 
participation both in developing and implementing regulatory programs24 
and the streamlining of agency internal rulemaking processes.25 It urged 
agencies to set better priorities to concentrate their regulatory resources on 
the most serious environmental, health, and safety risks and to engage in 
long-term regulatory planning26 and also to make better use of science 
advisory boards as tools to use scientific data more widely in agenda-
setting and decisionmaking.27
But, importantly, despite the mood of “reinvention” that pervaded the 
entire project, our team concluded that no fundamental procedural changes 
in the regulatory process were necessary. The report’s two primary 
procedural recommendations subscribed to two of ACUS’s major 
recommendations—that the President should encourage agencies to use 
 21. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS (1993) [hereinafter IMPROVING REGULATORY 
SYSTEMS], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/review.html. 
 22. Id. at REG01: Create an Interagency Regulatory Coordinating Group. 
 23. Id. at REG02: Encourage More Innovative Approaches to Regulation. 
 24. Id. at REG04: Enhance Public Awareness and Participation. 
 25. Id. at REG05: Streamline Agency Rulemaking Procedures. 
 26. Id. at REG07: Rank Risks and Engage in “Anticipatory” Regulatory Planning. 
 27. Id. at REG08: Improve Regulatory Science. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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negotiated rulemaking and that in enforcing regulations, the President 
should strongly encourage agencies to use alternative means of dispute 
resolution.28 These were included in our report because of the success of 
two statutory supplements to the APA, enacted in 1990, that have been 
mentioned by my colleagues today, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act29 and 
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act.30
1. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act 
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act was enacted with the strong joint 
support of ACUS (which developed the idea)31 and the ABA (which 
became an enthusiastic supporter).32 It established a statutory framework 
for agency use of negotiated rulemaking to formulate proposed 
regulations. It largely codified the practice of those agencies that had 
previously used the procedure, allowed each agency a lot of discretion 
about using negotiated rulemaking, and should be viewed as a supplement 
to the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. This 
means that the negotiation sessions generally take place prior to issuance 
of the notice and the opportunity for the public to comment on proposed 
rules that is required by the Act. In some instances, negotiations may also 
be appropriate at a later stage of the proceeding and have sometimes been 
used effectively in drafting the text of a final rule based on comments 
received. 
In her presentation and in her writings, Professor Freeman has 
described negotiated rulemaking quite well. Since 1982 it has been used 
perhaps seventy times by various agencies, most prominently the EPA and 
Department of Transportation. It has had many successes, and even when 
the negotiating group has failed to reach unanimous agreement, the 
 28. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review’s Regulatory 
Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L. J. 1165 (1994); IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra 
note 21, at REG03: Encourage Consensus-Based Rulemaking; Id. at REG06: Encourage Alternative 
Dispute Resolution When Enforcing Regulations. 
 29. Pub. L. No. 101–648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2000)). The Act was 
permanently reauthorized by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 
§ 11, 110 Stat. 3873 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 101–552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified primarily in 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584); 
permanently reauthorized by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
320, 110 Stat. 3870. 
 31. See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 82–4), 47 Fed. Reg. 
30,708 (July 15, 1982); Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 85–5), 50 
Fed. Reg. 52,895 (Dec. 27, 1985). 
 32. See American Bar Association Resolution urging permanent reauthorization of 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and Negotiated Rulemaking Act (Feb. 1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/7
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agencies have gained valuable information and momentum from these 
proceedings.33  
However, as shown by the small overall total of “reg-negs,” the 
technique is still used in a relatively small percentage of agency 
rulemakings. I think there are several reasons for this. For one thing, since 
1995 ACUS has not been there to provide assistance and encouragement 
to agencies to use it.34 Another reason is that budgeting process tends to 
skew priorities in favor of short-term thinking: there are some distinct 
front-end costs of hiring conveners and facilitators and holding negotiating 
sessions that must be paid during the current fiscal year while the ultimate 
benefits in terms of rapid completion of the process and reduced likelihood 
of judicial challenge all tend to accrue in the next fiscal year. And, finally, 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has the power to 
 33. There remains a lively debate on the pros and cons of negotiated rulemaking. See generally, 
Symposium, Twenty-Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997). Several 
critics have argued that negotiated rulemaking allows agencies to transfer too much control to private 
parties. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your 
Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 
(1987) (arguing that EPA’s negotiated woodstove emissions rule went beyond the bounds of the Clean 
Air Act); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory 
Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994). Cary Coglianese has challenged empirically the basic 
assumption that regulatory negotiation has produced faster and less litigated rules. See Cary 
Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 386 (2001); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997).  
 On the other hand, the authors of several empirical studies have strenuously objected to the critics’ 
claims. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (finding significant legitimacy benefits); Philip J. Harter, A Plumber 
Responds to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor Menkel-Meadow’s Essay on Deliberative 
Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379 (2004–05) (summarizing his arguments in response to critics of 
regulatory negotiation); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000) (rebutting Professor Coglianese); Laura I. 
Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, 
Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599 (2000) (finding that 
participants felt negotiated rules were superior, and more likely to be implemented, than conventional 
rules); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 195–202 (2005) (finding good arguments on both sides, but generally 
siding with Coglianese on empirical debate with Harter); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: 
Limits on Collaboration as the Basis For Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 458 
(2000) (“The collaborative process is most promising, however, if used as a tool to guide agency 
discretion, rather than as an alternative mechanism to promulgate regulations backed by the coercive 
power of the state.”). For commentary on EPA negotiated rulemakings, see Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 33–55 (1997) [hereinafter 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance; Siobhan Mee, Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined 
Sewer Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213 (1997) 
(lauding the success of this particular negotiated rulemaking). 
 34. See supra note 7. 
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review agency rules pursuant to presidential executive order, is at best 
lukewarm about this process because it can reduce OMB’s leverage over 
the agencies.35
Nevertheless, I am a strong supporter of using negotiated rulemaking 
whenever the conditions are right, and I think that the advent of electronic 
rulemaking36 can only make it easier to conduct such proceedings. 
2. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
The other major statutory supplement to the APA was the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA). Again this law was 
enacted with the joint support of ACUS and the ABA (which also has a 
special Section of Dispute Resolution). 
The ADRA, like its cousin the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, is not 
mandatory. It sets out a framework for agencies to use in employing 
various ADR techniques such as mediation, arbitration, minitrials, early 
neutral evaluation, settlement judges and ombudsmen. It also explicitly 
authorizes agencies to use these techniques, thus removing potential legal 
questions about their authority to do so. Finally, it encourages such 
activity by protecting the confidentiality of ADR proceedings conducted 
under this Act.37 One way it does this is to ensure that ADR 
communications in the hands of government neutrals are exempt from the 
Freedom of Information Act.38 It also streamlines the process for 
government contracting with outside neutrals.39
 35. I base this on candid conversations with members of OMB’s career staff. Officially, however 
OMB implements Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, which, among other 
things, specifies that agencies are “directed to explore and, where appropriate, use consensual 
mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated rulemaking.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 
Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 6(a) (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 36. For a succinct history of the “rise of e-rulemaking,” see Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: 
Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 363–366 (2004). See 
also Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening 
Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421 (2002); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Future of 
Electronic Rulemaking: A Research Agenda (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Regulatory Policy Program, Paper No. RPP-2002-04, 2002), reprinted in ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 
Summer 2002, at 6; Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 
433 (2004); Stuart W. Shulman, E-Rulemaking: Issues in Current Research and Practice, 28 INT’L J. 
OF PUB. ADMIN. 621 (2005); Stephen Zavestoski & Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet and 
Environmental Decision Making: An Introduction, 15 ORG. & ENV’T 323, 326 (2002). Links to some 
of these and many other related papers and studies are available on the website of the Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Regulatory Policy Program, at http://www.ksg. 
harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers&reports.htm. 
 37. See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000). 
 38. See id. § 574(j). 
 39. See id. § 573(e). To expedite the hiring of neutrals, § 7 of the 1996 ADRA also amended the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/7
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Government use of ADR is a win-win situation when it is done 
correctly. The government and private parties both benefit by having 
reduced litigation costs, and the resulting agreements are often more 
acceptable and durable as well. Of course there are times when the use of 
ADR is not appropriate, and the Act spells those out—such as when an 
authoritative precedential decision is required or when the outcome might 
significantly affect persons or organizations who are not parties to the 
dispute.40
In 1996 Congress added some perfecting amendments to each of these 
two Acts and also made them both permanent. Congress has thus 
implicitly confirmed that the federal government’s use of collaborative 
processes have just as much place in agencies’ activities as do formal 
adjudication, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and other more formal 
procedures. In short these were two statutory reforms that have been 
excellent additions to the APA. 
II. PROFESSOR FREEMAN’S “COLLABORATIVE REGULATION” APPROACH 
These reforms are also very consistent with the thrust of Professor 
Freeman’s work. In a short time, she has become one of our leading 
commentators on collaborative regulation.41 She begins with the 
proposition that traditional regulation is not working well, that the 
rulemaking process is too rigid (“ossified”), that implementation is 
inconsistent, and that enforcement is at best sporadic. While this is 
certainly true about some rulemakings, many rulemakings are successful, 
so I would not want our Japanese colleagues to underestimate the basic 
success of the notice-and-comment model in many situations.  
Nevertheless, U.S. rulemaking does have some undue complications 
these days and Professor Freeman argues that different types of 
collaborative relationships between government and multiple stakeholders 
can help solve this problem. She points to the successes of negotiated 
rulemaking and of EPA’s Project XL—a program that allowed companies 
competitive requirements of defense agency (10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(3)(C)) and federal civilian agency 
(41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(3)(C)) contracts to use non-competitive contracting procedures to hire such 
neutrals.  
 40. See 5 U.S.C. § 572(b) (2000). 
 41. See, e.g., Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 33; Jody Freeman, The 
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, The Contracting State]; 
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Jody Freeman 
& Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 
(2000). 
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to deviate from specific pollution control performance requirements if they 
proposed alternative approaches that were acceptable to affected 
stakeholders, including environmental groups.42
I agree with her that these approaches are promising ones43—and 
should be considered on a case by case basis. But their success depends 
almost entirely on the adequacy of the participation and representativeness 
of the stakeholder groups. Success will ultimately depend on the 
implementation of the agreement reached in the collaborative proceeding. 
If the environmental group, for example, is not given enough opportunity 
to make its case, or does not adequately represent the needs of the relevant 
community (or communities), the negotiations will either fail or will not 
hold in the end.  
As I indicated before, I also believe that such proceedings can and 
should operate within the traditional boundaries of the APA. Negotiated 
rules should still be subject to public comment and judicial review. 
Moreover, it is the agency that maintains the ultimate responsibility for the 
policy choice made. Agency accountability should not be shirked. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS—GROWING REGULATORY DEMANDS AND 
SHRINKING REGULATORY RESOURCES 
Of course there is something else going on in our regulatory state that 
Professor Freeman recognizes. The federal government workforce is 
shrinking. It is at the lowest level since the Eisenhower Administration.44 
But the demands of the modern regulatory state are not shrinking; in fact 
they are growing. This requires alternative techniques for achieving 
regulatory goals. One way is for the government to depend more on the 
so-called “shadow government”—the world of government contractors. 
 
 
 42. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 33, at 55–66. See also Dennis D. Hirsch, 
Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA’s Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219 
(2001); Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1998). For a more critical view, 
see Rena I. Steinzor, Dialogue, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any 
Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,527 (1996). 
 43. A similar approach was added to the Endangered Species Act in the 1982 amendments—the 
negotiation of “habitat conservation plans” (HCD) under 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000). See, e.g., 
J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1273–84 (2004) (discussing the unfulfilled potential of the HCP program). 
 44. Executive Branch civilian employment in September 2005 was 2.636 million, see 
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2005/september/table9.asp. Between 1953 and 1961, the total 
number hovered between 2.382 million (1958) and 2.558 million (1953). See U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 2, 
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-01.pdf. 
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Thus, there has been a recent growth in what might be called “non-
government government”—or to use a term Professor Freeman has used—
“subgovernment.”45  
Professor Freeman cleverly titled one of her articles, “The Contracting 
State.”46 This word “contracting” has a double meaning. It can mean 
“contracting” in the sense of awarding government contracts. And it can 
mean “contracting” in the sense of shrinking. Her article addresses the 
blurry distinction between government contracts and regulation. This is 
helpful because administrative law has always treated them as rather 
distinct activities. 
To show how far we have come, recall the APA’s exemption from 
public notice and comment for rules dealing with government grants and 
contracts.47 These matters were once thought to be strictly proprietary 
activities of the government. Now, of course, government procurement 
programs are multi-million dollar programs with huge social 
consequences.  
The upshot of this, as she explained in her article, is that government 
contracts (and their first cousin, government grants—which she aptly calls 
“conditional awards of funding”48) are now being used to implement 
government policies that are traditionally associated with government 
regulations—rules. 
So the result is that we now have a process for agency rulemaking that 
is laden with public participation requirements, external reviews by OMB 
and Congress, and intensive judicial review. But with respect to 
individualized government agency agreements with regulated interests 
(nursing homes or polluters, for example), we typically do not have notice 
and comment, OMB review, congressional oversight, or intensive judicial 
review. 
These government activities operate under the radar screen, which may 
be one reason they are increasing. But is this trend salutary or worrisome? 
The answer is that it is both. 
One fundamental question is the appropriateness (legally, ethically, and 
consequentially) of the executive agencies sub-delegating their power to 
private sector, privatized entities like stock exchanges, voluntary 
consensus standard-setting bodies, managed healthcare organizations, and 
 45. Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 41, at 187. 
 46. Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 41. 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). See also supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 48. Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 41, at 166. 
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private prisons.49 For example, we have seen recently, with some of our 
Wall Street scandals, that it was not enough for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to rely on self-regulatory organizations set up by 
the large accounting firms. In some situations it may be enough for the 
federal agency to serve as the backstop—overseeing the activities of the 
self-regulatory organization. In other situations, direct federal government 
regulation is necessary.  
I also think it is unsustainable for the federal government to continue to 
reduce its regulatory workforce while the agencies are assigned so many 
more tasks in their regulatory role. Agency regulators now have to conduct 
about ten separate analyses for every major regulation, and OMB is about 
to add new peer reviews requirements.50 How can agencies do all this with 
fewer employees? The only way is to outsource many of these tasks. EPA 
and other agencies have long relied extensively on contractors to review 
comments in rulemaking. I would suspect that the agency would rather 
hire its own employees to do this kind of work. And indeed there are civil 
service rules against overusing consultants to undertake work normally 
done by civil service employees.51 This is a large potential problem for our 
government. 
Finally, I can agree that use by agencies of contracts or intermediaries 
to achieve regulatory ends may be potentially a good thing if there are 
enough safeguards and accountability mechanisms. One suggestion that 
occurred to me is the possibility of instituting public participation 
requirements for certain types of government contracts—perhaps there 
should be notice and comment before the Justice Department agrees to 
award a contract to a private prison or before EPA allows a special 
arrangement with a polluting company. 
With that last, possibly constructive, suggestion, let me conclude by 
saying that I have learned a lot from the stimulating remarks by my 
colleagues and I hope our presentations have been valuable to you as well 
as you proceed with your reform agenda in Japan. 
 49. See, e.g., Douglas Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1995); Paul R. Verkuil, The Nondelegable Duty to Govern 
(Cardozo Sch. of Law, Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 149, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=871455. 
 50. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FINAL INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR 
PEER REVIEW (2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html. 
 51. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lovitky, The Problems of Government Contracting for Consulting Services, 
14 PUB. CONT. L.J. 332 (1984) (detailing the legal complications governing government agency use of 
contractors instead of employees); William V. Luneburg, Contracting by the Federal Government for 
Legal Services: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 410–35 (1988) 
(discussing similar problems). 
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